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THE ABERCROMBIE CLASSIFICATIONS AND
DETERMINING THE INHERENT DISTINCTIVENESS
OF PRODUCT CONFIGURATION TRADE DRESS
INTRODUCTION
Trade dress is the total visual image of a product and the
overall impression it creates.1 "[It] is a complex composite of
features" to be considered together,2 including a product's size,
shape, color and graphics.3 A restaurant's decorative design
has even been held to constitute trade dress.4 The two general
categories of trade dress are product configuration and product
packaging.5 Product configuration is the visual design of the
product itself rather than the container in which it is sold.
Because many companies make significant efforts to create
' Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabani, Inc., 505 US. 763, 764 n.1 (1992);
Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir. 1990);
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. a (1995) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
2 American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d
Cir. 1986) (quoting SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Lab., 481 F. Supp. 1184,
1187 (D.N.J. 1979), aftd, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980)); see Jeffrey Milstein, Inc.
v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating the combina-
tion of design elements should be the focus of a trade dress distinctivenLs inqui-
ry).
s LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985); John H.
Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating
that trade dress includes "product!s size, shape, color or color combinations, tex-
ture, [or] graphics").
' See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764 n.1 ("Taco Cabana's trade dress may include
the shape and general appearance of the exterior of the restaurant, the identifying
sign, the interior kitchen floor plan, the decor, the menu, the equipment used to
serve food, the servers' uniforms and other features reflecting on the total image
of the restaurant."); Fuddrucker's, Inc. v. Doe's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837,
841 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that plaintiffs trade dress consisted of overall impres-
sion created by interior design, floor plan, furnishings and fixtures of restaurant,
as well as method of food preparation and presentation).
r See Jeffrey Milstein, 58 F.3d at 31.
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recognizable products in order to increase consumer association
between the product and the producer, trade dress protection
is of great economic and legal importance.6
Trade dress and trademarks are grouped together as trade
symbols.7 The principal purpose in protecting trade symbols is
to provide consumers with reliable information about a
product's source.' By protecting distinguishing marks and de-
signs that identify the producer of a product, trademark law
reduces the cost consumers incur in finding quality merchan-
dise, " induces producers to provide quality goods and fosters
competition between producers. ° Thus, the fundamental issue
in trade symbol protection is whether the public purchases the
article because of its perceived source."
Trade symbol protection is provided by the Lanham Act
("the Act").' Sections 2 and 32 of the Act protect registered
trade symbols from infringement,13 and section 43(a) protects
unregistered symbols. 4 The Act aims primarily to prevent
deception and unfair competition.'5 For a trade symbol to be
0 See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECoN. 265 (1987).
" While trademarks are symbols such as insignias, emblems and logos used to
identify producers, trade dress is a broader concept that "includes the total look of
a product and its packaging and even includes the design and shape of the prod-
uct itself." 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADFMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETION § 8.0112], at 8-
5 (3d ed. 1994).
8 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Pirone v.
MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1990).
' Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1303 (1995); 1 MCCAR-
THY, supra note 7, § 2.0112], at 2-3; Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 268-70.
10 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303; Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.,
469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (citing S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3-5
(1946) (citations omitted)).
" Crescent Tool v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300-01 (2d Cir. 1917).
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1994).
" Id. §§ 1052, 1114.
14 Section 43(a) of the Act proscribes "false designation of origin" generally. Id.
§ 1125(a).
, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767-68 (1992). Before
Two Pesos, the circuits were split as to whether the owner of a product, in order
to obtain legal protection for his or her design, needed to establish in all cases
that his or her product's trade dress had acquired secondary meaning with the
public.
Secondary meaning exists when consumers have come to associate the
product's design with that specific producer. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at cmt.
e; see infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. For example, through continued
exposure over time the public has come to perceive crackers and cookies in pack-
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protected under the Act, it must be nonfunctional, distinctive
and so similar to a defendant's trade symbol that consumer
confusion as to the source of the defendant's product will likely
result."6 In order for a trade symbol to be deemed distinctive,
it either must be inherently distinctive or have acquired sec-
ondary meaning.'
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., the Supreme
Court endorsed use of the same test applied to trademarks to
determine whether trade dress is inherently distinctive.'" But
the application of this standard, first enunciated by Judge
Friendly of the Second Circuit in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc.,' has provided more confusion than guid-
ance to federal courts attempting to follow Two Pesos. In ap-
plying the Abercrombie test in the past, courts have held trade
symbols to be inherently distinctive if they are suggestive,
arbitrary or fanciful, but not if they are generic or descrip-
tive." In Two Pesos, the Supreme Court accepted without
question the district court's use of these classifications to de-
termine the inherent distinctiveness of the trade dress at is-
sue.
2 1
Subsequently, federal circuit courts have interpreted Two
Pesos inconsistently. In Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic
aging containing elves as coming from the Keebler Company. The Act uses the
phrase "acquired distinctiveness" rather than secondary meaning. 15 U.S.C. §
1052(e)-(O.
Before Two Pesos, the Second Circuit required proof of secondary meaning in
all trade dress protection cases. See, eg., Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809
F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987). At the same time, the Fifth Circuit held that a
showing, of secondary meaning is not always required for trade dress protection.
Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702
(5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982). The Supreme Court resolved
this circuit split when it held that secondary meaning need not be established
where trade dress is inherently distinctive. Two Pesos, 605 U.S. at 770.
16 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769; Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129,
132 (8th Cir. 1986).
' RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13; see supra note 15, infra notes 8849 and
accompanying text for a definition and discussion of secondary meaning.
"' See Two, Pesos, 505 US. at 773 (stating that "[tIhe Fifth Circuit was quite
right in CheVron, and in this case, to follow the Abercrombie classifications consis-
tently and to inquire whether trade dress for which protection is claimed under §
43(a) is inherently distinctive.").
537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text for a detailed description of the
Abercrombie classifications.
21 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768-70.
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Enterprises, Ltd.,22 the Third Circuit held that the
Abercrombie classifications apply only to packaging trade dress
and devised a different test for product configuration trade
dressy However, the Eighth Circuit refused to adopt this dis-
tinction in Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., stating that the
Two Pesos holding applied to all forms of trade dress.2'
The Duraco decision has met with mixed reviews from
other courts.2 ' Deciding on the proper test to determine the
inherent distinctiveness of product configurations has even
caused problems within the Second Circuit, the court which
originally set forth the Abercrombie classifications." Despite
the resulting controversy, the Third Circuit's concerns over the
applicability of these classifications to product configuration
trade dress are well founded. Different forms of trade dress do
vary in how effectively they designate a product's source.2
Thus, product configurations should be required to pass a pre-
liminary hurdle verifying their capacity to serve as source
identifiers before the four-prong Abercrombie test is applied.
A test which adequately measures the degree to which
trade dress designates source, however, does not require con-
sideration of consumer association, as the Third Circuit has
suggested in Duraco. It is a trade symbol's originality which
determines its inherent capacity to serve as producer identifi-
cation, not the consumer's ability to associate the symbol with
the producer.29 There is no valid reason to change this rule
for product configurations. Indeed, the Supreme Court held in
40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
" See infra Part II-.A2.
24 51 F.3d 780, 787 (8th Cir. 1995); see infra notes 146-147 and accompanying
text.
' See Mulberry Thai Silks, Inc. v. K & K Neckwear, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 789,
793-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (acknowledging the disagreement between circuits and prob-
lems in applying the Abercrombie classifications to product configuration trade
dress, yet choosing not to employ the three-prong Duraco test); Health 0 Meter,
Inc. v. Terraillon Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1160, 1170-71 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (choosing to
apply the Abercrombie classifications), appeal dismissed without opinion, 52 F.3d
342 (Fed. Cir. 1995); cf Knitwaves Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1008 (2d
Cir. 1995) (agreeing with the reasoning in Duraco, but not endorsing the Third
Circuit's three-prong test for inherent distinctiveness).
28 See infra Part II.C.
Mulberry, 897 F. Supp. at 792.
28 Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1448-50 (3d
Cir. 1994).
" Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 786 (8th Cir. 1995).
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Two Pesos that consideration of consumer association is unnec-
essary to determine the inherent distinctiveness of trade
dress."
Part I of this Note reviews the law governing trade dress
infringement, including the Supreme Court's Two Pesos deci-
sion. Part 11 describes the recent split among the circuits ap-
plying Two Pesos, as well as the internal split within the Sec-
ond Circuit. Part mI analyzes the problems that have devel-
oped in applying the four-prong Abercrombie test to product
configuration trade dress, and evaluates the Second and Third
Circuits' alternative tests to determine inherent distinctiveness
in these cases. Part IV proposes the addition of a preliminary
test for product configurations that confirms their capacity to
identify producers.
I. TRADE DRESS LAW
Trade symbols are protected primarily for economic rea-
sons. 1 " The fundamental purposes of trademark law are to
protect the public from being deceived as to a product's source,
and to foster fair competition among producers.' The Su-
preme Court recently elaborated on these goals in the context
of the transaction costs involved, stating:
In principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a
source-identifying mark, "reduces the customer's costs of shopping
and making purchasing decisions," for it quickly and easily assures
a potential customer that this item-the item with this mark-is
made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he
or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law
helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor)
will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a
desirable product.'
" See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 770-71 (1992).
" See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 6; Some commentators suggest
that morality is a key factor in protecting trade symbols. This view tends "to be
based on the notion that people are entitled to something not as an incentive to
work harder, but because ies right. Essentially, the reasoning is that individuals
should have property rights in that which they create. Alex Kozinsld, Essay:
Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 966-67 (1993).
1 Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 1994); Truck
Equip. Serv. Co. v. Freuhauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 861 (1976).
1 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1303 (1995) (quoting 1
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Trademark law prohibits competitors from impersonating an-
other producer in order to take advantage of the goodwill the
other has developed, and thus promotes the production of qual-
ity goods.' By promoting fair competition, trademark law also
fosters creativity among producers. 5
Because both trade dresses and trademarks are intended
to distinguish the products of one producer from those of oth-
ers, the two are generally defined by the same legal stan-
dards. 6 Currently, the federal courts are instructed to apply
the same tests and analyses to both trademark and trade dress
in order to determine if legal relief from infringement is war-
ranted."
A. Requirements for Protection
Traditionally, courts apply a three-part test to determine
whether to extend protection to a trade symbol. For the owner
of a trade dress or mark to gain legal protection, his or her
trade symbol must be: (1) nonfunctional;"5 (2) distinctive; and
(3) likely to be confused by consumers with the defendant's
imitative trade symbol, thus creating a misunderstanding as to
the origin of the defendant's product. 9 Although the presence
of each of these three elements is to be considered indepen-
dently of one another, nonetheless they are interrelated con-
cepts.4"
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2.01[21, at 2-3).
34 Id.
3' See Willajeane F. McLean, The Birth, Death, and Renaissance of the Doctrine
of Secondary Meaning in the Making, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 737, 739 (1993) (arguing
that courts have relaxed the traditional requirements of trade symbol protection
with regard to trade dress "[in order to foster creativity and promote competi-
tion").
"' Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); see Aromatique,
28 F.3d at 868 (stating that "the difference between trade dress and trademark is
no longer of importance in determining whether trade dress is protected by federal
law.").
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774.
s Id. at 769. Instead of requiring a plaintiff to establish that his or her trade
symbol is nonfunctional, some jurisdictions view functionality as an affrmative
defense. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
"' Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769; Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 132 (8th
Cir. 1986).
40 See infra pp. 849-50 and accompanying notes.
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1. Functionality
A trade symbol must first be nonfunctional to obtain legal
protection. The promotion of fair competition requires that
functional features be denied trademark protection because
providing such protection would impede the public's access to
useful articles by limiting the number of producers who could
provide the articles.41
A functional feature is one essential for a product to fulfill
its purpose or one which "affects the cost or quality of the
article.' Courts consider a trade symbol to be functional, and
thus unprotectable, if it "confers competitive advantages upon
its user" in addition to identifying the producer.
Although the Supreme Court has defined functionality, the
federal courts employ different tests to determine whether a
trade symbol is functional." Some circuits use what is known
41 Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing
In re Walter Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 841, 844 (C.C.P.A. 1980)). When courts extend
protection to trade symbols, they preclude competitors from copying or using the
same symbol. Thus, if trade symbol protection is granted to the design of a func-
tional feature-for example, the hook on the back of telephone handsets which
eliminates the need to hold the handset while communicating-then the first pro-
ducer will be provided with a potentially permanent monopoly on that useful fea-
ture. Consumers will be able to acquire that item only from that one producer and
surely will have to pay a premium.
Instead, it is the role of patent law to provide limited protection to functional
features and designs that are truly innovative.
I Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1932); se
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct 1300, 1304 (1995); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,
305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
Daniel J. Gifford, The Interplay of Product Definition, Design and Trade
Dress, 75 MINN. L. REV. 769, 781 (1991) (stating that a design is not functional,
and is therefore protectable, if it "performs an intended utilitarian function, but
not significantly better than alternative designs"); see Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304.
For example, Fotomat's distinctive yellow roof and kio3k design has been
provided trade dress protection even though it functions as shelter in addition to
identifying the photo developer. Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231,
1235 (D. Kan. 1977). Because Fotomats roof was no better than any other at
providing shelter and, therefore, conferred no competitive advantage on Fotomat,
the roof design was deemed functional only in a de facto sense. In other words,
the yellow roof design was protectable because its primary function was to identify
Fotomat.
"See Beth F. Dumas, Note, The Functionality Doctrine in Trade Dres and
Copyright Infringement Actions: A Call for Clarification, 12 HASMIGS CO4. &
ENT. L.J. 471 (1990).
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as the "important ingredient" test, where a product feature is
regarded as functional if it is an important ingredient in the
commercial success of the product.45 According to this test, a
trade symbol is nonfunctional if its primary purpose is to iden-
tify the producer rather than to improve the product's cost or
quality.
46
However, the "important ingredient" test has met with
much criticism.47 Courts have interpreted this test to mean
that the more visually attractive a trade symbol is, the less
likely it is to identify its producer.48 Thus, the "important in-
gredient" test works as a disincentive for the development of
creative, attractive designs.49 This test ignores the fact that
trade symbols usually make products more attractive in addi-
tion to distinguishing manufacturers or brands from others."0
The "important ingredient" test is closely tied to the con-
cept of aesthetic functionality, which states that visual appeal
can be an essential element of product quality." In jurisdic-
"4 The "important ingredient" test for de jure functionality was set forth in
Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater.
If the particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial
success of the product, the interests in free competition permits [sic] its
imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright. On the other hand,
where the feature or, more aptly, design, is a mere arbitrary embellish-
ment, a form of dress for the goods primarily adopted for purposes of
identification and individuality and, hence, unrelated to basic consumer
demand in connection with the product, imitation may be forbidden ....
Under such circumstances, since effective competition may be undertaken
without imitation, the law grants protection.
781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Freuhauf
Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1217-18 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976)).
4Id.
4' See Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke KG. v. THC Systems, Inc., 999 F.2d
619, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that the "important ingredient" test "is contro-
versial and has been seriously limited by this circuit in recent cases").
See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 340-41 (7th Cir. 1985).
" LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1985).
'0 W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 340.
" LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 78 (stating that central to the question of the func-
tionality of the sports bag design at issue was whether consumers were induced to
purchase the LeSportsac bag because its design was more attractive or because
the design distinguished the bag as a LeSportsac product; if the latter, the design
is eligible for trade dress protection because it serves to identify the product's
source); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1952) (stat-
ing that the china designs at issue were not eligible for trademark protection
because they were "an important ingredient in the commercial success of the prod-
uct . . . [and] not merely indicia of source").
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tions recognizing aesthetic functionality, a product's design is
deemed functional not only if it improves the produce's utilitar-
ian performance, but also if consumers are induced to purchase
the product because of its appearance. 2 These courts follow
the rule that where a product's design induces purchase pri-
marily due to its visual appeal, the product's trade dress is
functional and therefore not protected.3 Thus, trademark pro-
tection is denied to decorative features unless their primary
purpose is to identify the product's source.' But like the "im-
portant ingredient" test, the doctrine of aesthetic functionality
is not widely accepted and has been highly criticized.' In ad-
dition, those courts that recognize aesthetic functionality apply
the doctrine in various ways."
The more widely adopted functionality test ensures that
protection of the trade symbol at issue will not confer a com-
petitive advantage on its owner. Courts using the "competitive
advantage" test evaluate whether market competitors need the
trade symbol at issue in order to compete effectively "or wheth-
er it is the kind of merely incidental feature which gives the
brand some individual distinction but which producers of com-
peting brands can readily do without."'7 In applying this test
62 Kozinski, supra note 31, at 965.
Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343-44.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 7.06.
See Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 606 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (describing the doctrine of aesthetic functionality as 'unnecessary and illogi-
ca").
For an extensive review of the circuits which recognize the doctrine of aes-
thetic functionality and its application in each, see generally Ralph S. Brown,
Design Protection: An Oueruiew, 34 UCLA L. RsV. 1341, 1364-74 (1987).
Of specific relevance to this Note is the Third Circuit's treatment of aesthetic
functionality. Here, Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir.
1981) serves as precedent. The Third Circuit declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit's
"broad view" of aesthetic functionality enunciated in Pagliero u. Wallace China Co.
The court criticized Pagliero as considering only the commercial desirability of the
feature at issue without consideration of its utilitarian function, and thus provid-
ing a disincentive for development of imaginative and attractive design. Instead,
the Third Circuit held that a design is eligible for trademark protection when it is
not significantly related to the utilitarian function of the product. Brown, supra, at
1373.
Thus, the Third Circuit's "strict view" of aesthetic functionality makes eligible
for trademark protection attractive designs which induce the product's purchase so
long as they are not closely related to the product's utilitarian function.
' W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 346 (7th Cir. 1985); fee Fabrication
Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that a trade
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to product configurations, functional designs are those with
features essential to effective competition, and thus commonly
used, in their particular market."8 Functionality is determined
by the availability of alternative designs, names or symbols.69
This "competitive advantage" test follows more closely the
Supreme Court's definition of functionality.' °
In addition to applying different tests to determine func-
tionality, the federal courts also disagree as to which party
bears the burden of proving functionality or nonfunctionality.
In some circuits, functionality is used as an affirmative de-
fense.6 In other circuits, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving nonfunctionaliy."
2. Distinctiveness
Functionality is closely associated with distinctiveness, the
second requirement for obtaining trade symbol protection. The
distinctiveness requirement facilitates the fundamental pur-
pose of trademarks-to identify product source-by ensuring
that protected trade symbols be clearly distinguishable from
others. A trade symbol is considered distinctive and thus
protectable if it is either inherently distinctive or has acquired
secondary meaning in the minds of the consuming public.'
dress, "even one that contributes to the function of the product, may be protected
under the Lanham Act unless the costs to competition of precluding competitors
from using the [trade dress] are too high").
" Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 70 F.3d 251, 253 (2d Cir.
1995); Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 605-06; see W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 339.
", See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992) (recogniz-
ing as valid the Fifth Circuit's holding that "a design is legally functional, and
thus unprotectable, if it is one of a limited number of equally efficient options
available to competitors and free competition would be unduly hindered by accord-
ing the design trademark protection"); Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809
F.2d 971, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1987).
See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
61 See Abbott Lab. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 20 (7th Cir. 1992)
("[F]unctionality .. .is actually an affirmative defense as to which [defendant]
bears the burden of proof."); W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 338; LeSportsac, Inc. v. K
Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985).
2 See Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633
(3d Cir. 1992); Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); accord, Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (plaintiff has the burden of proving non-
functionality once a prima facie case of functionality is made by an opponent).
' Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13, at 37-
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Prior to Two Pesos, the circuits split on the issue of wheth-
er the owner of an inherently distinctive trade dress had to
establish that his or her design had acquired secondary mean-
ing.' Though the circuits increasingly accepted the concept of
inherent distinctiveness, some continued to require a showing
of secondary meaning up to the time of Two Pesos.' The Su-
preme Court resolved this dispute when it held that secondary
meaning is not required where a trade dress is so uncommon,
creative and unique that it may be presumed to identify the
product's source.'
Until 1981, the distinctiveness requirement could only be
fulfilled by trade symbols that consumers had come to associ-
ate with specific producers. The concept that an owner may
demonstrate the distinctiveness of a trade symbol without also
demonstrating secondary meaning first arose at the federal
level in Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups,
Inc.67 Chevron claimed that the defendants copied the packag-
ing design of its lawn and garden chemical products, but the
district court rejected the claim for failure to establish that the
packaging had acquired secondary meaning.' The Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that a plaintiff is required to show sec-
ondary meaning only when his or her trade symbol "is not
sufficiently distinctive of itself to identify the producer.'
The doctrine of inherent distinctiveness developed due to
judicial concern over the financial inability of small producers
to establish secondary meaning with consumers before compe-
tition ariived, ° or to prove subsequently the existence of sec-
ondary meaning in court. The federal courts also have recog-
38 & cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990)); Aromatique, 28 F.3d at 869; see supra
note 15 and infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text for a definition and discus-
sion of secondary meaning.
"See supra note 15; see also Aromatique, 28 F.3d at 869 (citing In re DC
Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1050-51 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring)).
"See supra note 15; see also Knitwaves Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996,
1007 (2d Cir. 1995).
"See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773-74.
v 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982).
"Id. at 696.
9 Id. at 702-03.
7' See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775; Knitwaves Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d
996, 1007 (2d Cir. 1995).
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nized inherent distinctiveness as a legal concept because pro-
tection of these trade symbols promotes entrepreneurship and
innovation among producers.71
To determine the inherent distinctiveness of trade sym-
bols, the courts have developed a classification system based
on the degree to which the subject trade symbol describes the
product.72 In Abercrombie, Second Circuit Judge Henry J.
Friendly held that the distinctiveness of trademarks falls into
one of the following categories: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3)
suggestive; or (4) arbitrary or fanciful.73 Courts consider trade
symbols that fall into only the last two categories to be inher-
ently distinctive and therefore protected without a showing of
secondary meaning.74
Generic trade symbols are those that "refer[ I to the genus
of which the particular product is a species."75 That is, generic
symbols use common descriptive names or designs utilized by
others producing goods of the same type or class.76 Generic
trade symbols are never protected from imitation or copying,
since doing so would unfairly limit competition.77 Descriptive
symbols designate or make reference to the characteristics,
qualities, effects or features of the product,78 and are protect-
ed only if shown to have acquired secondary meaning."
"' See Brown, supra note 56, at 1386 ("If the product is one that requires
substantial investment, whether of capital or of talent, the investment may not be
made if the prospect of profit, cloudy at best, is made more risky by the likelihood
that competitors will enter, drive prices down to their marginal costs, and leave
the originator with no return on her sunk costs, and with no hope of profits that
will balance the risk of failure.").
72 Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1434 (3d Cir.
1994).
7 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976).
7 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768-69.
7 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)
(citing Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9).
7' For example, the phrase "orange juice" could never earn trademark protec-
tion because it is merely a common description of the product, rather than a
unique phrase which stands out in the mind of the consumer as identifying the
juice producer.
See generally Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194.
For example, the term "Orange Nectar" used on orange juice would be re-
garded as descriptive rather than generic because it makes reference to the color
and nature of orange juice. Since the term is closely associated with the character
of the product itself, it would only be protected after acquiring secondary meaning
with consumers.
71 See supra note 15, infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text defining and ex-
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Suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful trade symbols are con-
sidered inherently distinctive because they make little or no
reference to the products they identify.' Suggestive symbols
require imagination to make a connection between the product
and the symbol, though they are based on the products charac-
teristics to a very limited extent."' Arbitrary symbols have a
widely recognized significance in everyday life, but that signifi-
cance is unrelated to the product to which the mark is at-
tached.' Fanciful symbols are those created by the producer
and thus carry no previous meaning whatsoever.' These
three types of symbols identify a product's source without reli-
ance on consumer awareness or knowledge of the product it-
self, and therefore are considered distinctive without a showing
of secondary meaning.
Many circuits apply the four-prong Abercrombie test with-
in the context of the product market at issue.' Determining
which of the classifications a trade symbol falls into cannot be
done in a vacuum,s' but must involve consideration of indus-
try standards and customs." Unless the trade symbol at issue
plaining secondary meaning.
' Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
" For example, the wrapper of Klondike ice cream bars has been held to be a
suggestive trade dress, because the packaging contains images associated with a
frigid environment but makes no descriptive reference to ice cream. Ambrit, Inc. v.
Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974, 980 (11th Cir.), opinion superseded, 812 F.2d 1531 (11th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 'Coppertone = is regarded as a sug-
gestive mark since it engenders notions of a dark skin color that consumers de-
sire, yet makes no real reference to the tanning lotion itsel
I For example, "Ivory" is considered an arbitrary mark because it possesses a
common meaning but not with regard to soap.
' Examples of fanciful marks are "Kodak" for cameras and "Exxon7 for gaso-
line since they are terms created by the producers and therefore have no prior
significance.
In Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals explained the role of market context in determining inherent dis-
tinctiveness:
In determining whether a design is arbitrary or distinctive this court has
looked to whether it was a 'common! basic shape or design, whether it
was unique or unusual in a particular field, [or] whether it was a mere
refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation
for a particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or orna-
mentation for the goods ....
568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
' Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1985).
" See Ambrit, 812 F.2d at 1536 (applying the Seabrook test to product packag-
ing); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 12 (2d Cir.
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is "so unique, unusual or unexpected in this market that one
can assume without proof that it will automatically be per-
ceived by customers as an indicia of origin,"87 it will not quali-
fy as inherently distinctive.
Where the .trade symbol at issue is regarded as descrip-
tive, and thus not inherently distinctive, to obtain protection
owners must demonstrate that their symbol has acquired sec-
ondary meaning. Secondary meaning is defined as buyer asso-
ciation." It is acquired over time after consumers begin to
identify a product with its producer due to its design or pack-
aging. To establish secondary meaning, producers must show
that consumers have come to identify the trade symbol with
the manufacturer rather than the product itself.89 While such
association or identification may be proven through many
types of evidence,' it is usually very difficult to establish sec-
ondary meaning."
1976) (agreeing with the trial court that "the word 'safari' in connection with
wearing apparel is widely used by the general public and people in the trade,"
and therefore concluding the mark was generic).
s' MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 8.02[4].
See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982)
(explaining that secondary meaning is consumer association between a feature and
the "source of the product rather than the product itself); Coach Leatherware Co.
v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that secondary
meaning exists when consumers associate a feature with a particular source);
McLean, supra note 35, at 749-50; Gary Schuman, Trademark Protection of Con-
tainer and Package Configurations-A Primer, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 779, 805-06
(1983); see also supra note 14.
Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 851 n.11.
90 Forms of evidence used to establish secondary meaning include the following:
"(1) advertising expenditures, (2) consumer studies linking the mark to a source,
(3) unsolicited media coverage of the product, (4) sales success, (5) attempts to
plagiarize the mark, and (6) length and exclusivity of the mark's use." Centaur
Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1222 (2d Cir.
1987).
" McLean, supra note 35, at 748-49 (citing Coach Leatherware, 933 F.2d at
169) (recognizing that "proof of secondary meaning entails vigorous evidentiary
requirements"); William F. Gaske, Note, Trade Dress Protection: Inherent Distinc.
tiveness as an Alternative to Secondary Meaning, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1123, 1135-
37 (1989) (discussing difficult burden of proof for secondary meaning).
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3. Likelihood of Confusion
After the owner of a product has established that his or
her trade dress is nonfunctional and distinctive, the dress is
regarded as protectable. In order to gain legal protection, the
owner must then show that the trade dress of the defendant's
product is likely to confuse consumers as to its origin. This
final requirement is the primary test for unfair competition:
whether the defendant's trade dress is likely to mislead con-
sumers as to the source of his or her product.' Like second-
ary meaning, courts consider many factors when deciding
whether a likelihood of consumer confusion exists,' but no
definitive test or concrete formula exists to determine this."
The disparate tests utilized to determine functionality,
distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion have created in-
creasingly inconsistent results among the circuits in trade
symbol infringement suits. The Supreme Court rarely grants
certiorari to trademark appeals, but did so in Two Pesos in an
effort to standardize the protection of trade symbols. Despite
the Court's efforts, the Two Pesos decision has failed to meet
this goal.
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(I) (1994); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 769 (1992); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 937 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990). Likelihood of confusion must be shown to
obtain injunctive relief, but the owner of a trade symbol must establish actual con-
sumer confusion for an award of money damages. See Resource Developers, Inc. v.
Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., Inc., 926 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1991).
93 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
For example, "(a) the similarity of the trade dress, (b) the similarity of the
products to which those trade dresses are attached, (c) the area and manner of
concurrent consumer use, (d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by consum-
ers in making their purchasing decision, (e) the strength of plaintiff's trade dress,
(f) actual confusion among consumers, and (g) the intent of the alleged infringer
'to palm off his product as that of another.' Health 0 Meter, Inc. v. Terraillon
Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1160, 1174-75 (1995) (quoting Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v.
Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th Cir. 1993)).
" See McLean, supra note 35, at 752-53; see also Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas,
839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that factors listed supra note 94 are
flexible guide to help determine likelihood of confusion).
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B. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.
In Two Pesos, the Supreme Court faced the issue of wheth-
er, in an action for trade dress infringement, a plaintiff with
an inherently distinctive trade dress also is required to estab-
lish that the trade dress has acquired secondary meaning."
The trade dress at issue in Two Pesos was the decorative de-
sign of two Mexican restaurants. Taco Cabana's trade dress in-
cluded dining areas decorated with Mexican "artifacts, bright
colors, paintings and murals," an indoor/outdoor patio which
could be divided with overhead garage doors, a stepped exteri-
or with a "festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint
and neon stripes," and brightly colored awnings and umbrel-
las. 7
Taco Cabana was established in 1978. Two Pesos adopted
a similar decorative design when it opened in 1985. The two
restaurant chains entered into direct competition when Taco
Cabana expanded its operations to Houston, Dallas and El
Paso in 1986, where Two Pesos was already doing business. In
1987, Taco Cabana sued Two Pesos in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas for trade dress infringe-
ment. 8
The district court instructed the jury that Taco Cabana's
trade dress was protected if it was either inherently distinctive
or had acquired secondary meaning. The jury found that the
restaurant design was inherently distinctive but had not ac-
quired secondary meaning. A verdict in favor of Taco Cabana
was entered, and Two Pesos appealed. The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed, rejecting the appellant's argument that a finding of no
secondary meaning contradicted a finding of inherent distinc-
tiveness.9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard argu-
ment on April 21, 1992. The Court held that because both
trademark and trade dress protection are intended to prevent
deception and unfair competition, both forms of trade symbols
96 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764-65.
Id. at 765 (quoting Taco Cabana Intl, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d
1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991)).
93 Id.
" Id. at 766-67.
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should be held to the same standard.' Thus, inherently dis-
tinctive trade dress is also protectable under the Lanham Act
without a showing of secondary meaning.'0 ' Two Pesos was
decided without dissent; Justice Scalia filed a concurring opin-
ion,1 2 and Justice Stevens"3 and Justice Thomas' filedopinions concurring in the judgment.
1. Abercrombie Classifications Endorsed
In addition to its holding in Two Pesos, the Supreme Court
accepted the district court's finding that Taco Cabana's restau-
rant decor was inherently distinctive, a finding reached by use
of the classifications enunciated by the Second Circuit in
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. " Thus, the
Supreme Court endorsed the use of the Abercrombie classifica-
tions to determine the inherent distinctiveness of trade dress
as well as trademark.'
InAbercrombie, the plaintiff was a retailer using the word
"safari" as a trademark for a line of clothing. Abercrombie &
Fitch sued Hunting World for trademark infringement because
the defendant used the term "safari" to sell hats, to name a
section of its store, and in the title of a newsletter it is-
sued."7 After stating the four-prong test to determine inher-
ent distinctiveness,0 " Judge Friendly concluded that the
plaintiffs mark was generic, and therefore not protectable,
because "safari" is commonly used to refer to apparel associat-
ed with jungle safaris. The court also held the mark to be ge-
neric when applied to the defendant's newsletter since it con-
tained "bulletins as to safari activity in Africa."
103
The district court that initially decided Two Pesos used the
Second Circuit's Abercrombie classifications to determine the
inherent distinctiveness of Taco Cabana's restaurant decor,
o Id. at 774.
"o Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767.
Ica Id. at 776.
lo Id
104 Id. at 785.
10 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
"o Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773.
1o7 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 7-8.
" See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
109 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 12.
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and the Supreme Court endorsed the district court's finding
that the design was inherently distinctive."' The Supreme
Court in Two Pesos specifically upheld the Fifth Circuit's hold-
ing that Taco Cabana's inherently distinctive trade dress was
entitled to protection even though there was no showing that it
had acquired secondary meaning."' The Court set forth two
arguments to support its uniform treatment of trademarks and
trade dress. First, the Court stated that Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act does not distinguish between the two.' The
statute mentions neither trademarks nor trade dress, but deals
generally with all forms of unfair competition."' Second, the
Court asserted that requiring owners of inherently distinctive
trade dress to prove secondary meaning would provide them
with less protection than trademark owners. The Court con-
cluded that such a result would run counter to the Lanham
Act's goal of preventing deception and unfair competition. Pre-
serving goodwill and good reputation is as important to a trade
dress owner as to a trademark owner, the Court reasoned, and
protecting these interests benefits the consumer equally in
both instances."4
110 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 770.
, Id.
112 Id. at 773.
1 The Lanham Act proscribes false designation of origin or false description in
any form:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same,
and shall cause such goods to be entered into commerce ... shall be
liable to a civil action . . . by any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or repre-
sentation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
.. "Protection of trade dress, no less than of trademarks, serves the [Lanham]
Act's purpose to 'secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and
to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.
National protection of trademarks is desirable, Congress concluded, because trade-
marks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the pro-
ducer the benefits of good reputation.'" Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774 (quoting Park
'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (citing S. REP.
No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3-5 (1946) (citations omitted))).
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2. Consumer Recognition Irrelevant
In addition to endorsing the district court's use of the
Abercrombie classifications, the Two Pesos Court stated that
determining the inherent distinctiveness of a trade dress does
not involve considering whether the consumer associates the
product with the producer as a result of the trade dress. Rath-
er, according to the Court, it is the trade symbol's capacity to
identify the producer that is determinative." The Court not-
ed that the purpose of protecting inherently distinctive trade
symbols is to acknowledge "the owner's legitimate proprietary
interest in its unique and valuable informational device, re-
gardless of whether substantial consumer association yet be-
stows the additional empirical protection of secondary mean-
ing."
11 6
Though Two Pesos seemingly put to rest the issue of
whether an owner of an inherently distinctive trade dress must
prove secondary meaning to gain protection, it did not settle
definitively the question of which test should be employed to
determine the inherent distinctiveness of trade dress. While
the Supreme Court endorsed application of the four-prong
Abercrombie test, this was not the specific issue before the
Court. The Supreme Court assumed that the jury's finding of
inherent distinctiveness was valid."" The Fifth Circuit up-
held the jury's finding,"' and the Supreme Court conducted
no further inquiry into the issue. 9 Thus, Abercrombie's ap-
plicability to trade dress was not before the Court in Two Pe-
sos.
I. THE CiRcurr CONFLCT
Since Two Pesos, the circuits have split on whether the
Abercrombie classifications can be used to determine the inher-
ent distinctiveness of all forms of trade dress. In Duraco Prod-
"' See id. at 770-71.
116 1& (quoting Taco Cabana Intl, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1120
n.7 (5th Cir. 1991)).
117 "The instructions were that, to be found inherently distinctive, the trade
dress must not be descriptive.' I& at 766 n.3.
.. Id. at 767.
i- See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 766-67.
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ucts, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd.,120 the Third Circuit
held that the four-prong Abercrombie test cannot be used to
determine the inherent distinctiveness of product configura-
tions, though the test is fine for product packaging trade dress.
The Third Circuit concluded that because the Abercrombie
classifications are based on the degree to which the trade dress
describes the product, they are inapplicable to product configu-
rations since configurations cannot describe the products of
which they are a part.
12 1
The Duraco court stated that Two Pesos does not preclude
such a distinction, because the only issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the owner of an inherently distinctive trade
dress must prove secondary meaning.122 In addition, the
Third Circuit justified its holding by claiming that the trade
dress at issue in Two Pesos, a restaurant's decorative design,
was "more akin to product packaging than product configura-
tion."'2
In Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 24 however, the
Eighth Circuit declined to follow Duraco's narrow interpreta-
tion of Two Pesos. The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the Third
Circuit's conclusion that a restaurant's decor is more akin to
packaging. The Ampad court stated that there exists no dis-
tinct line between packaging and configuration that would
warrant different, treatment. 25 Instead, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the Supreme Court treated trade dress as a
single concept and intended Two Pesos to govern both product
configuration and packaging.
26
A. Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd.
In Duraco, the Third Circuit determined the inherent
distinctiveness of a Grecian urn style plastic planter for use in
gardens. Duraco claimed that Joy Plastic infringed its inher-
ently distinctive trade dress by marketing a planter that was
120 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
121 Id. at 1434.
122 Id. at 1442 (citing Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767 & n.6).
12 Id. at 1442.
"' 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 788.
2 Id. at 787.
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similar in shape and texture.' The Third Circuit held that
though the district court properly denied protection to Duraco's
planter design, it erred in applying the four-prong Abercrombie
test to determine the inherent distinctiveness of the product's
configuration.' Instead, the court held that in order for a
product configuration to qualify as an inherently distinctive
trade dress, it must be: (1) unusual and memorable; (2) concep-
tually separable from the product; and (3) likely to serve pri-
marily as a designator of origin of the product.'
1. Two Pesos Distinguished
In Duraco, the Third Circuit held that the Supreme
Court's endorsement of the Abercrombie classifications applied
to product packaging, but not to product configurations like
Duraco's Grecian urn design. The Duraco court found this
distinction necessary because a product's configuration is an
inherent and inextricable part of the product itself and, thus,
cannot be a "symbol" which signifies the product to any de-
gree.13 Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that it would
be inappropriate to apply the Abercrombie classifications to
determine the inherent distinctiveness of product configuration
trade dress.
Further, the Duraco court reasoned that because the per-
ceived purpose of product configurations is different than that
of trademarks and packaging, it would be improper to apply
the Abercrombie classifications to configurations. Rather than
source identification, "product designs are more likely to be
seen merely as utilitarian or ornamental aspects of the
goods."' 3' The Third Circuit explained that, on the other
hand, courts presume imaginative trademarks and packaging
to have developed consumer association since they have no
prior meaning with consumers and their only apparent pur-
Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1433.
Id at 1434. The district court held Duraco's planter design to be neither
suggestive nor arbitrary and fanciful. Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters.
Ltd., 822 F. Supp. 1202, 1209 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
' Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1448-49.
1 Id. at 1434.
s Knitwaves Inc. v. Lollytegs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1008 (2d Cir. 1995); Duraco,
40 F.3d at 1441.
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pose is to identify producers.1 2 Thus, the court held that be-
cause the Abercrombie classifications are based on a pre-
sumption of consumer association, the four-prong test is inap-
propriate to determine whether product configurations are
inherently distinctive; instead, the proper test must weigh the
potential for consumer association.133
The Third Circuit noted that Two Pesos allowed for this
distinction since it concerned only the specific issue of whether
the owner of an inherently distinctive trade dress must show
secondary meaning to obtain legal protection."84 The Duraco
court did not decide "whether trade dress, and in particular
trade dress in a product configuration, can actually ever be
considered inherently distinctive."'35 In addition, the Third
Circuit held that the Supreme Court's dicta regarding the
application of the Abercrombie classifications to trade dress
was not directed to product configurations, since the trade
dress at issue in Two Pesos was a restaurant's decor, a form of
trade dress "more akin to product packaging than product
configuration."
13 6
Based on this interpretation, the Duraco court decided
that the Abercrombie endorsement applied only to product
packaging, and that the Supreme Court did not make a sweep-
ing decision that all forms of trade dress are to be put to the
same test to determine inherent distinctiveness. Instead, the
Third Circuit read Two Pesos as leaving room for departure.
i" In addition to the use of packaging as a primary tool to identify a product
with its source, the Third Circuit distinguished product configuration from product
packaging based on the availability of alternative designs for each:
Product packaging designs, like trademarks, often share membership in a
practically inexhaustible set of distinct but approximately equivalent vari-
ations, and an exclusive right to a particular overall presentation general-
ly does not substantially hinder competition in the packaged good, the
item in which a consumer has a basic interest. A product configuration,
contrariwise, commonly has finite competitive variations that, on the
whole, are equally acceptable to consumers.
Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1448 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 16 cmt. b (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 1990)).
13 Id. (stating that one of the circumstances indicating a product configuration
is inherently distinctive is "where consumers are especially likely to perceive a
connection between the product's configuration and its source").
,s' Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764-65 (1992).
Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1440.
.s Id. at 1442.
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2. The Third Circuits Three-Prong Test
The Third Circuit replaced the Abercrombie classifications
with a three-part test for inherent distinctiveness in product
configuration trade dress. To be inherently distinctive under
Duraco, a product configuration must be: "(1) unusual and
memorable; (2) conceptually separable from the product; and
(3) likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the
product."
37
The Third Circuit concluded that this test better addressed
the issues it viewed as central to a determination of inherent
distinctiveness for product configurations. The court empha-
sized that inherently distinctive configurations must bear a
high probability of serving "a virtually exclusively identifying
function for consumers."' The Duraco court also stated that
for a finding of inherent distinctiveness, a court's concern over
the "theft' of an identifying feature or combination or arrange-
ment of features and the cost to an enterprise of gaining and
proving secondary meaning [must] outweigh concerns over
inhibiting competition ... .13'
With this new standard, the Third Circuit essentially
required that inherently distinctive product configurations
possess the same qualities as inherently distinctive trade-
marks and packaging. The Third Circuit did not allow for the
presumption of secondary meaning it saw being made in the
application of the Abercrombie classifications."' But while
the Duraco test thus was intended to ensure that inherently
distinctive configurations serve primarily as designators of ori-
gin," the Third Circuit provided no guidance as to how this
determination should be made.
By also requiring inherently distinctive product configu-
rations to be unusual and memorable, the court added to the
formula consideration of the potential for consumer associa-
tion, though it did not require proof of actual secondary mean-
ing.' In addition, by requiring product configurations to be
Id at 1448-49.
Id. at 1434, 1448.
1Id.
14 See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
.. See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
12 Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995).
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conceptually separable for a finding of inherent distinctiveness,
the Third Circuit introduced a principle without foundation in
trademark law.
143
B. Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp.
In Ampad, the Eighth Circuit faced the issue of
Abercrombie's applicability to product configurations. There,
the trade dress at issue was the design of specialized pre-
bound pads and notebooks, commonly known as personal orga-
nizers. Stuart Hall claimed that Ampad infringed its inherent-
ly distinctive trade dress by marketing a line of organizers
with a similar design. The products were unquestionably simi-
lar. In fact, Ampad's president admitted that the graphics and
text of his product were copied directly from Stuart Hall's
design.'
The district court dismissed Stuart Hall's claim because its
organizer design had not acquired secondary meaning and was
not inherently distinctive. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit re-
versed this decision and remanded the case for retrial because
the district court determined inherent distinctiveness by as-
sessing whether the organizer's configuration was "striking in
appearance, or at least memorable."4"
In Ampad, the Eighth Circuit chose to employ the tradi-
tional Abercrombie classifications rather than the three-part
test set forth in Duraco. In doing so, the Eighth Circuit criti-
cized both the analysis and conclusions of the Third Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit first took issue with the basic premise of
the Duraco decision, that product packaging and product con-
figuration are distinct and therefore deserve different treat-
ment to determine inherent distinctiveness. The Ampad court
1" Conceptual separability is a principle of copyright law. Pictorial, graphic and
sculptural elements of useful articles must be separable from the utilitarian as-
pects of the articles to obtain copyright protection. While a clear majority of the
circuits require that these elements be both physically and conceptually separable
from the utilitarian aspects of the article, the Second Circuit requires either form
of separability to be present. The Second Circuit has held that conceptual separa-
bility exists when the design elements of an article reflect aesthetic choices and
are not dictated by the article's utilitarian function. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econo-
my Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
14 Ampad, 51 F.3d at 783.
1 Id. (emphasis added).
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concluded that product configuration and packaging are often
difficult to distinguish, citing the restaurant decor at issue in
Two Pesos as such a situation, and stated that "to create a
distinction between the two artificially treats things that are
alike differently."
146
Ampad rejected the Third Circuit's contention that Two
Pesos allows for the distinction between product configuration
and product packaging. The Eighth Circuit supported its con-
clusion by taking note of the language used in Two Pesos. The
Ampad court recognized that the Supreme Court used only the
term "trade dress" and gave no indication that the two forms of
trade dress should be treated differently."7 Thus, the Eighth
Circuit declined to distinguish between packaging and configu-
ration and decided to accord the same treatment to both in
determining inherent distinctiveness.
The Eighth Circuit also took issue with the first prong of
the Duraco test, the requirement that product configurations
be "unusual and memorable" before they are deemed inherent-
ly distinctive. According to the Ampad court, this was simply
the secondary meaning requirement with a lower burden of
proof since it would require a showing of likely, rather than
actual, consumer association."8 The Eighth Circuit stated
that any inherent-distinctiveness test which requires a show-
ing of secondary meaning, even in the form suggested by the
Third Circuit, would undermine Two Pesos."'
In endorsing the use of the Abercrombie classifications, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that consumer association cannot be
considered in determining whether any trade dress-packaging
or product configuration-is inherently distinctive. Rather, the
proper question is to what degree the trade dress is "dictated
by the nature of the product."50 Therefore, whether consum-
ers will remember a design and associate it with its source is
irrelevant to inherent distinctiveness."5
"1 Id. at 788.
" Id. (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 605 U.S. 763, 772 (1992)).
14 Id.
"'Ampad, 51 F.3d at 788.
*" Id. at 788.
,5' Id. at 786-87.
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C. The Second Circuit's Internal Split
The question of whether application of the Abercrombie
classifications is appropriate to determine the inherent distinc-
tiveness of product configuration trade dress has caused prob-
lems within the Second Circuit as well. In Knitwaves Inc. v.
Lollytogs Ltd., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
answered this question in the negative, adopting instead only
the last prong of the Duraco test."2 The Second Circuit held
that the test to determine the inherent distinctiveness of a
product configuration is whether it is "likely to serve primarily
as a designator of origin of the product."'53 The court indicat-
ed that configurations pass this test when their producers
intend for them to serve a source-identifying function." 4
The Knitwaves decision has been followed closely by Sec-
ond Circuit courts155 except in Krueger International, Inc. v.
Nightingale, Inc.'56 There, Judge Sotomayor of the Southern
District of New York stated that the Knitwaves test "confuses
the analytical requirements for inherent distinctiveness with
those of secondary meaning."'57 In Krueger, the court instead
employed the test set forth almost twenty years ago in
Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd.,' wherein the
Abercrombie classifications are applied within the context of
the relevant market.' The Southern District's rare depar-
ture from "binding" precedent illustrates the difficulty courts
have had in developing the proper test to determine the in-
herent distinctiveness of product configuration trade dress.
152 71 F.3d 996, 1008-09 (2d Cir. 1995).
1"3 Id. at 1008 (quoting Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d
1431, 1449 (3d Cir. 1994)).
'" Id. at 1008-09 (stating that the Two Pesos Court did not intend to do away
with the statutory requirement that a trademark owner "use" or "intend to use"
the mark to signify source, and holding that Knitwaves's sweater designs fail to
qualify as inherently distinctive because they were not intended as source identifi-
cation).
15 Judith Ripka Designs, Ltd. v. Penny Preville, 935 F. Supp. 237, 1996 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 829, *60-61 (S.D.N.Y 1996); Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp.
1065, 1070-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
... 915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
t Id. at 602.
15 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.PA. 1977).
15 Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 603, 607; see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying
text.
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1. Knitwaves Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd.
In Knitwaves, the Second Circuit decided whether a line of
children's knitwear was inherently distinctive. In 1990,
Knitwaves began manufacturing a collection of children's cloth-
ing with fall and ecological motifs, which it called its "Ecology
Group." In 1992, Lollytogs introduced a competing line of
children's clothing, which included a leaf sweater and a squir-
rel cardigan that were very similar to two of Knitwaves's de-
signs. In fact, Lollytogs's design managers conceded that their
designs were taken from the Knitwaves sweaters."
After learning of Lollytogs's similar line of clothing,
Knitwaves obtained a preliminary injunction against Lollytogs
on September 1, 1992, in the Southern District of New
York. 6' The district court concluded that Lollytogs "set out to
knock [Knitwaves's sweater designs] off and they clearly did
that."" After a bench trial on June 1, 1994, the district court
"adopted and reaffirmed the findings and conclusions made at
the preliminary injunction hearing" and held, inter alia, that
Lollytogs violated the Lanham Act by willfully copying
Knitwaves's sweater designs."
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the Southern
District's holding that Lollytogs violated the Lanham Act.
Although the Second Circuit rejected Lollytogs's argument that
Knitwaves's sweater designs were aesthetically functional,"
it found that the designs did not qualify for trade symbol pro-
tection because they were not "used as a mark to identify or
distinguish the source."" The court came to this conclusion
' See Knitwaves Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (2d Cir. 1995).
161 Id at 999.
' Id. at 1001 (quoting Transcript of Proceedings of Sept. 1, 1992, at 2-3,
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., No. 92 Civ. 6285, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEIS 7207
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
13 I&
"' Lollytogs argued that granting trademark protection would preclude other
manufacturers from using leaves and squirrels on children's fall sweaters, and
thus would impede fair competition. The court reasoned that protection would not
preclude use of such designs entirely, but only those that are "so similar as to
create a likelihood of confusion." Therefore, the Second Circuit held that Lollytogs
did not meet the market foreclosure requirement of functionality. Id at 1005-06.
1 Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1006.
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after devising a new test to determine the inherent distinctive-
ness of product configurations.
Like the Third Circuit in Duraco, the Second Circuit in
Knitwaves found the Abercrombie classifications inapplicable to
product configuration. The court acknowledged that previously
it had found use of the Abercrombie classifications appropriate
to determine the inherent distinctiveness of trade dress.166
However, the Second Circuit distinguished Knitwaves from
these cases on the fact that the trade dress at issue here was a
product configuration rather than product packaging." 7 The
court concluded that the two types of trade dress were to be
judged by different standards to determine inherent distinc-
tiveness."6
The Second Circuit found the Abercrombie classifications
to be inapplicable with regard to product configurations for the
same reasons set forth by the Third Circuit in Duraco. The
Knitwaves court agreed with the Third Circuit that product
configurations cannot "describe" products to any degree, and
that consumers are unlikely to perceive a product's design as
an indication of its source.
16 9
Although the Second Circuit agreed that product configu-
ration and packaging should be treated differently to deter-
mine inherent distinctiveness, it did not agree with the three-
prong test the Third Circuit set forth in Duraco."7 ° Rather,
the Knitwaves court held that a product configuration is inher-
ently distinctive if it is "likely to serve primarily as a designa-
tor of origin of the product," adopting only the third prong of
the Duraco test.'7' The court found this to be the proper test,
because rather than source identification, the primary purpos-
'" Jeffirey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 31-32 (2d
Cir. 1995); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577,
583-84 (2d Cir. 1993).
"6 The court, however, overlooked the fact that the trade dress at issue in
Jeffrey Milstein was a line of greeting cards employing die-cut photographic de-
signs, which it held to be generic. 58 F.3d at 33-34.
13 See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1007-09.
16 See id. at 1007-08.
170 The Second Circuit declined to adopt the first two prongs of the Duraco test,
finding that they are "not rooted in the language of the Lanham Act." Id. at 1009
n.6.
171 Id. at 1008 (quoting Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters. Ltd., 40 F.3d
1431, 1449 (3d Cir. 1994)).
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es of product configurations are likely to be functional or aes-
thetic." Applying this test, the Second Circuit held that
Knitwaves's sweater designs were not inherently distinctive
because the manufacturer did not intend for them to serve
primarily as source identification.'
2. Krueger International, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc.
In Krueger, the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York determined whether a chair design was in-
herently distinctive. In 1976, Krueger began manufacturing its
Matrix chair, a strong, stackable and lightweight chair used to
accommodate large audiences. The design patent Krueger ob-
tained for the Matrix chair expired in 1991.174 In 1995,
Nightingale began producing its Beetle chair, which it admit-
tedly copied from Krueger's Matrix chair "down to the last de-
tail."
175
Krueger filed a complaint against Nightingale on Decem-
ber 19, 1995, claiming trade dress infringement under section
43 of the Lanham Act, and requested a preliminary injunc-
tion.76 Although the district court denied Krueger's motion
for a preliminary injunction,' the court held that the Matrix
chair design did in fact qualify as inherently distinctive.'
However, in arriving at this determination, the Southern Dis-
trict chose not to employ the Second Circuit's Knitwaves test to
determine the inherent distinctiveness of the chair configura-
tion at issue.'79
172 Id.
1 Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1009. In Knitwaves, the court summarily concluded
that the plaintiffs intent in employing the sweater designs was primarily aesthetic
rather than to provide source identification. Id. Thus, the Second Circuit provided
no indication of what factors should be assessed to determine producer intent.
I" Krueger Intl, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 598 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
17 Id. at 598-600.
176 Id. at 598, 600.
1 The court held that because Krueger waited over six months after learning
of Nightingale's plans before it sought legal protection, there was no "ikelihood of
irreparable harm or a balance of hardship tipping in [Krueger's] favorn Thus,
while Krueger was able to show a likelihood of success on the merits, it did not
meet the burden for preliminary reliefE Id. at 612-13.
178 Id at 607.
1 Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 601-04, 606-07.
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The Krueger court rejected use of the Knitwaves test for
three reasons: First, Knitwaves contravenes the Supreme
Court's view, as expressed in Two Pesos, that trade dress and
trademark comprise a "'single concept'... requiring a single
test for inherent distinctiveness."18 Second, the Knitwaves
test confuses the requirements for inherent distinctiveness
with secondary meaning by taking into consideration the po-
tential for consumer association. 8' Third, the Knitwaves
court incorrectly presumed that a design's primary purpose
cannot be both aesthetic and to serve as producer identifica-
tion.82
The Southern District began its criticism of the Knitwaves
decision by finding fault with the distinction the Second Cir-
cuit made between product configurations and packaging. The
court pointed out that the Supreme Court in Two Pesos sought
to unify the law regarding trade dress and trademarks by
resolving the circuit split over the question of whether second-
ary meaning need be shown to protect inherently distinctive
trade dress." In addition, the court agreed with the Eighth
Circuit that the restaurant decor at issue in Two Pesos fell
under product design rather than packaging, and that the
Supreme Court "expressly approved" the trial court's use of the
Abercrombie classifications to determine the inherent
distinctiveness of the decor."M The Krueger court concluded
that "balkaniz[ation of] this complex field into yet more subcat-
egories," as the Knitwaves test would create, is not what the
Supreme Court intended Two Pesos to produce. 5
The Southern District of New York then took issue with
the requirements of the Knitwaves test itself. Like the Eighth
Circuit in Ampad, the Krueger court concluded that by assess-
ing the likelihood that a product configuration will serve as
producer identification, the Knitwaves test requires consider-
ation of the potential for consumer association or secondary
1"0 Id. at 602 (citing Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th
Cir. 1995)).
'8' Id. at 602-03.
1 Id. at 606.
183 See id. at 602.
' Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 602 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763, 773-74 (1992)).
18s Id.
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meaning.' The court found such consideration inappropriate
since inherently distinctive designs are those "capable of iden-
tifying a particular source" due to their intrinsic qualities
alone.'
The Krueger court also found consideration of producer
intent to be irrelevant in determining inherent distinctive-
ness.ss The Southern District criticized not only the Second
Circuit's legal support for factoring producer intent into the
calculus, but also the logic behind it. The court pointed out
that the Knitwaves court relied on the Supreme Court's dicta
from Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., a case which
"hinged entirely on secondary meaning."" In addition, the
court in Krueger questioned the presumption made in
Knitwaves that the primary purpose of a design is either aes-
thetic or source identification, but cannot be both."'9 Because
it found this presumption invalid and the legal support for an
intent requirement flimsy, the Southern District of New York
did not follow the test to determine the inherent distinctive-
ness of product configurations set forth by the Second Circuit.
Instead, the Krueger court employed a test for inherent
distinctiveness which applies the Abercrombie classifications
within the market context. The court stated that the test enun-
ciated in Seabrook" was consistent with both the Supreme
Court's goal of holding all trade symbols to the same standard
and the Second Circuit's case law before and after Two Pe-
sos.'92 More significantly, the Seabrook test "clarifies the im-
portance of market context" in determining inherent distinc-
tiveness. l" It asks whether a product configuration "is so
unique, unusual or unexpected in this market that one can
assume without proof that it will automatically be perceived by
IS3 See L
1" Id. (quoting Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 771).
18 Id
' Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 602 (citing Qualitex, 115 S. Ct 1300, 1303 (1995)).
The Krueger court also rebutted the Second Circuits contention that its intent
requirement was based in the Lanham Act itself, stating that "a cloze reading of
Qualitex does not support the notion that the 'use or intended use' language of the
Lanham Act provides a definition of inherent distinctiveness. Id. at 602-03.
Id. at 606.
"'See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 603-04 (citations omitted).
L' I&i at 603.
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customers as an indici[um] of origin."" Thus, the Southern
District of New York held that the Seabrook test was more
appropriate than the Second Circuit's Knitwaves test to deter-
mine the inherent distinctiveness of product configurations.'
III. ANALYSIS
In Duraco, the Third Circuit identified a valid problem in
applying the Second Circuit's Abercrombie classifications to
determine the inherent distinctiveness of product configuration
trade dress. Put simply, a design may qualify as inherently
distinctive, according to the four-prong Abercrombie test, and
still not identify the producer. In Knitwaves, the Second Cir-
cuit joined the Third Circuit in criticizing the application of the
Abercrombie classifications to product configurations. However,
the Third Circuit's solution to this problem is inappropriate in
that it adds consideration of the potential for secondary mean-
ing to the determination of inherent distinctiveness."r This
addition is not only unnecessary, but it is in fact proscribed by
Two Pesos. While sharing this deficiency, the Second Circuit's
solution also is problematic because it requires consideration of
producer intent to determine the inherent distinctiveness of
product configurations.19
A. Abercrombie and Trade Dress
The Third Circuit held that the four-prong Abercrombie
test is inapplicable to product configurations because the four
classifications are based on the degree to which the trade sym-
bol describes the product, and product configurations cannot
describe products to any degree since they are part and parcel
of the products themselves."8 In addition, the Duraco court
concluded that because configurations do not make natural
source identification tags, as do trademarks and packaging,
19 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 8.02[4]; see Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812
F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying Seabrook test to design of product packaging),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
1 Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 606-07.
1 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
19 See supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
1.. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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applying the Abercrombie test to product configurations would
result in protection of designs that do not identify their pro-
ducers.' The Third Circuit was correct in these conclusions.
The solution to the former problem is a simple reversal of the
fact-finder's point of view. To correct the latter problem, how-
ever, product configurations should be required to pass a pre-
liminary hurdle before the Abercrombie classifications are
applied.
1. Abercrombie from a Different Perspective
The Third Circuit correctly noted that the Abercrombie
classifications have been based on the extent to which a trade
symbol describes the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of
its product."' Trade symbols that refer to the attributes of
products too directly inform consumers about the products
rather than their source and, thus, are usually not afforded
protection.2"' The extent to which a trade symbol describes,
and is therefore reliant on the characteristics of, the product
differentiates inherently distinctive symbols from those that
are generic or descriptive.
This type of reliance exists with product configurations as
well. While a configuration cannot make reference to the at-
tributes of the product, the configuration being an integral part
of the product itself, the product's character may still dictate
its configuration to various degrees.0 2 For example, auto de-
signs are in large part dictated by engineering constraints. But
if a manufacturer introduced a model with a unique design
that did not improve performance0 and only served to dis-
tinguish its auto from the rest, that configuration could theo-
retically qualify as inherently distinctive.
The four-prong Abercrombie test may be used to indicate
the degree to which a product's configuration relies upon or is
See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d
Cir. 1976).
See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
2 See Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 786 (8th Cir. 1995).
Whereby the auto design would be deemed nonfunctional because it confers
on the owner no competitive advantage over other manufacturers. See supra notes
57-60 and accompanying text.
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dictated by the nature of the product. A generic design would
be an unimaginative auto configuration closely tied to perfor-
mance and the automotive class in which it falls. The design
would be arbitrary or fanciful if it evoked no notions associated
with the particular class of auto-i.e., speed and power for
sports cars, elegance and comfort for luxury autos, durability
and ruggedness for utility vehicles.2
Difficulty arises, however, in differentiating the suggestive
configuration from the descriptive configuration. Judge Friend-
ly utilized the following definitions in Abercrombie, where he
was confronted with a trademark dispute: "A term is sugges-
tive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach
a conclusion as to the nature of goods. A term is descriptive if
it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients,
qualities or characteristics of the goods."20 5 This distinction
traditionally has been problematic when applied to trademarks
and packaging. The measure is one of degree, which by its very
nature is subjective, and court decisions often have been con-
troversial.2 6 Applying the distinction to product configura-
tions is even more difficult since a product's configuration is
part and parcel of the product itself.
The basic principles of trade symbol protection are more
helpful in resolving this problem. The doctrine of inherent
distinctiveness was established to foster innovation and entre-
preneurship by protecting imaginative trade symbols before
their owners are able to establish secondary meaning."7
Courts have required a high level of creativity for a finding of
inherent distinctiveness because such a finding provides the
trade symbol owner with a potentially perpetual monopoly on
the symbol's use.208 This high level of creativity must be
maintained for product configurations to qualify as inherently
distinctive. Because suggestive configurations are accorded
21 See Ampad, 51 F.3d at 786.
2"5 .Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir.
1976) (quoting Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 295
F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
206 For example, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc.,
805 F.2d 974 (11th Cir. 1986), where the packaging of Klondike ice cream bars
was held to be a suggestive trade dress, was met with significant criticism.
2 0 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
200 With some rare exceptions, trade symbol protection lasts as long as the
owner uses the symbol in commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994).
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trade symbol protection, they must be extremely imaginative
and only remotely tied to the attributes of the product. In
contrast, descriptive configurations, which will be protected
only after establishing secondary meaning, are designs more
clearly derived from the nature of the product.
Determining the originality of a design is concededly a
difficult endeavor, one that eludes consistent application.'
Courts often face this problem in determining the inherent
distinctiveness of trademarks and packaging. The task will be
more difficult with regard to product configurations because
these symbols are not natural tags. Yet, because a truly cre-
ative design can indicate product source just as well as any
mark or package,2 ° the increased effort is necessary to pro-
mote fair competition.
The four-prong Abercrombie test can be applied effectively
to determine the originality of configurations as well as pack-
aging and trademarks. Rather than completely ignore
Abercrombie, as the Second and Third Circuits suggest, the
traditional classifications may be employed with regard to
product configurations simply by inverting the frame of refer-
ence. In other words, the degree to which the product dictates
the configuration should be assessed, instead of the degree to
which the configuration describes the product.
2. A Preliminary Hurdle Is Needed
The Third Circuit was correct in concluding that the four-
prong Abercrombie test fails to confirm that a trade symbol
identifies a product's source. Unlike product configurations,
trademarks and packaging are natural labels identifying pro-
ducers.21' Because the Second Circuit originally developed the
Abercrombie classifications to determine the inherent distinc-
2 Compare Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke KG. v. THC Systems, Inc., 999
F.2d 619, 621 (2d Cir. 1993) (defendant manufacturer of chinaware could not dem-
onstrate that chinaware designs were in such short supply that it could not com-
pete in the market for hotel china without copying plaintiffs design) with Wallace
Intl Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1990)
(plaintiffs baroque silverware design was functional, and thus not protectable,
because effective competition in the silverware market required use of "essentially
the same scrolls and flowers"), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991).
211 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774-75 (1992).
211 See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.
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tiveness of just trademarks, the test assumes that the trade
symbol at issue acts as a source identifier. Since this is not
always the case with product configurations, many configura-
tions will qualify as inherently distinctive under Abercrombie
and yet will not identify their producers.
Source identification is the principal reason for protecting
trade symbols. 212 If a product configuration does not identify
the producer, it cannot be protected no matter how creative it
may be. Thus, application of the Abercrombie classifications
alone results in inadequate trade symbol protection with re-
gard to product configuration trade dress.
Unlike trademarks, product configurations do not serve
solely to identify producers; they also provide visual appeal.
Packaging provides visual appeal as well while serving as a
container, but it more readily acts as a signifier of source than
does product configuration. Indeed, product packaging and
trademarks are presumed to serve primarily as signifiers of
source if they are nonfunctional.213 Such a presumption, how-
ever, cannot be made in the case of product configurations." 4
Configurations of products that are highly dependent on
visual appeal make particularly poor source signifiers. The
more obvious examples of such products are clothing, table
settings, furniture and eyewear. The commercial success of
these goods is determined largely by the aesthetic appeal of
the designs employed. Consumers purchase these products
mainly because they are attractive; thus, their designs are less
likely to identify their producers.
The four-prong Abercrombie test, though, does nothing to
weed out creative designs that fail to identify the product's
source. For example, an imaginative sweater design which
evokes no notions of warmth or comfort would qualify as arbi-
trary or suggestive under Abercrombie even though it does not
designate the sweater's manufacturer whatsoever.215  In
22 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
21 Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583 (2d
Cir. 1993) (finding the design of a liquor bottle to be inherently distinctive).
214 Knitwaves Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1008 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating
that product features or designs cannot be presumed to serve a source-identifying
function because their "primary purposes are likely to be functional or aesthetic").
211 See id. at 1008-09 (declining to use Abercrombie classifications to determine
the inherent distinctiveness of a sweater).
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Knitwaves and Duraco, the Second and Third Circuits sought
to cure this deficiency by setting forth new tests to determine
the inherent distinctiveness of product configurations.
B. Duraco and Knitwaves Do Not Provide Solutions
After discussing the problems it saw in applying the
Abercrombie classifications to product configurations, the Third
Circuit in Duraco enunciated what it viewed as a more appro-
priate standard.216 The Second Circuit in Knitwaves adopted
only the third prong of the Duraco test, that a configuration be
likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the prod-
uct, as the standard by which the inherent distinctiveness of
product configurations should be judged.217
However, the Duraco test is inappropriate to determine
inherent distinctiveness primarily because it requires that the
potential for secondary meaning be considered, which the Su-
preme Court has held to be "superfluous."218 In addition,
Duraco provides no method to verify that a product configura-
tion is likely to serve as a signifier of source. While the Second
Circuit in Knitwaves sought to provide such a method by re-
quiring that producers intend that their configurations serve a
source signifying function, the court's legal support for impos-
ing this requirement was quite thin.21
The Supreme Court held in Two Pesos that, as with trade-
marks, it is unnecessary to establish secondary meaning when
trade dress is inherently distinctive.' Because the Duraco
test requires that a design be unusual and memorable to con-
sumers for a finding of inherent distinctiveness, those seeking
protection for product configurations will have to prove that
their designs are likely to develop secondary meaning." But
it is the intrinsic qualities of a product's design, rather than
the potential for consumer association, which indicate the
likelihood that it will serve as a signifier of source.' Indeed,
216 See supra Part H-A2.
217 See supra notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
218 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773-74 (1992).
21 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 772-75.
See Stuart Hall, Inc. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995).
'" See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (stating that marks "are deemed inherently
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the Supreme Court stated that secondary meaning is irrele-
vant to a determination of inherent distinctiveness, 223 and
the Second Circuit in Knitwaves declined to adopt Duraco's
"unusual and memorable" requirement because it is "not rooted
in the language of the Lanham Act."2 4 The Third Circuit's
requirement that a product configuration be unusual and
memorable confuses inherent distinctiveness with secondary
meaning, and undermines both Two Pesos and the Lanham Act
by holding product configuration to a higher standard than
trademark and packaging.
225
The Second Circuit's Knitwaves test, requiring that pro-
ducers intend configurations to serve as source signifiers, is
also deficient in that its grounding in the law is suspect, and it
ignores the fact that inherent distinctiveness depends on the
intrinsic nature of the trade dress itself. The Second Circuit
was correct in looking to the Lanham Act's definition of trade-
mark for guidance,2 6 but this definition does not address the
specific requirements for inherent distinctiveness. The court's
reliance on dicta from Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. is
also questionable as this was a decision based on the existence
of secondary meaning. 7 The Second Circuit's introduction of
a producer intent requirement to determine inherent distinc-
tiveness is not only unsupported by the law, but is also in
contravention to it. The determination of inherent distinctive-
ness requires examination of the intrinsic nature of the trade
symbol at issue, not an assessment of extrinsic factors having
little to do with the symbol itself.
2 8
distinctive . . . because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source
of a product"); Krueger Intl, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp 595, 602
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
s See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773-74.
2 Knitwaves Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1009 n.6 (2d Cir. 1995).
Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995); see Two
Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774 (stating that there exists no textual reason to treat "inher-
ently distinctive verbal or symbolic trademarks differently from inherently distinc-
tive trade dress").
' See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1008 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994)).
227 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1303 (1995); see Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915
F. Supp. 595, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
' See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (stating that marks "are deemed inherently
distinctive . . . because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source
of a product"); Krueger, 915 F. Supp at 602.
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Nonetheless, the Second and Third Circuits were correct in
requiring product *configurations to pass a hurdle confirming
their capacity to serve as source signifiers. The Abercrombie
classifications, if taken alone, fail to verify this vital factor. But
the Duraco test does nothing to help courts determine whether
configurations identify their producers, and the Knitwaues test
is grounded only tenuously in the law. A standard that is both
manageable and mindful of prior trademark law is needed for
consistent application.' As stated above, determining the
distinctiveness of trade symbols is by nature a subjective en-
deavor. Instructing courts to estimate the likelihood that the
configuration serves as a source signifier, without providing a
valid methodology to do so, only adds to this difficulty.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
In order to adequately determine the inherent distinctive-
ness of product configurations, the four-prong Abercrombie test
must be supplemented with a preliminary test which measures
a product configuration's capacity to identify its producer. Such
a test in combination with the Abercrombie classifications will
ensure that an inherently distinctive product configuration: (1)
in fact distinguishes its source from others; and (2) is creative
and not dictated by the product.
As with trademarks and packaging, the inherent distinc-
tiveness inquiry here cannot be conducted in a vacuum, but
must be carried out within the context of the market at is-
sue."0 Thus, any measure of a design's capacity to identify
its product must consider: (1) whether the configuration is
functional; and (2) the degree to which the commercial success
of the product at issue is dependent on the development of cre-
ative designs. Taken together these factors will aid courts in
determining whether a product configuration serves to identify
the producer.
While functionality and distinctiveness are discrete con-
cepts, consideration of the relevant market plays a role in the
determination of each."' It is now widely held that a product
See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
' See supra p. 825.
'* In fact, the Second Circuit's Knitwaves test, requiring that a product configu-
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configuration is functional if it employs design elements com-
monly used in the industry or market since competitors would
then be precluded from using useful designs. 2 It follows
from this definition that if a configuration is not functional in
that it does not employ common design elements, then it is
more likely to serve as a signifier of source.
The inquiry cannot end here, though, because product
configurations in certain industries employ uncommon design
elements and still do little or nothing to identify the producer.
The nature of the product and industry at issue is also impor-
tant in determining whether a product configuration serves to
signify its source. Certain markets are highly dependent on the
development of creative and innovative designs. In fact, at the
extreme are products whose commercial success is determined
largely by the continual introduction of imaginative designs.
These include clothing, tableware, furniture and eyewear. It is
less likely that the configuration of a product in markets such
as these will act as a designator of source.
Consideration of the degree to which an industry is driven
by the development of innovative designs is an extension of the
role market context has played in determining functional-
ity"3 and inherent distinctiveness' in the past. By deter-
mining whether innovative designs are commonplace in the
industry, rather than limiting the inquiry to whether the spe-
cific design in question is widely used, one can determine more
readily the likelihood that a creative design identifies its pro-
ducer.
Assessing the functionality of a product configuration
ensures that the design does not incorporate features common-
ly used in the market. Consideration of the marketplace's de-
pendence on design gauges an innovative configuration's pro-
pensity to signify source. By combining these two measuring
sticks, one may determine the likelihood that a product config-
uration identifies its producer. And by combining this test with
the four-prong Abercrombie test-which determines the cre-
ration be "likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product" for a
finding of inherent distinctiveness, sounds strikingly similar to descriptions of some
functionality tests. See supra notes 46, 54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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ativity of designs, marks and packaging equally well-the
inherent distinctiveness of product configurations will be more
readily ascertainable.
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit in Duraco brought to light once again a
serious deficiency in employing the Second Circuit's four-prong
Abercrombie test to determine the inherent distinctiveness of
product configurations. Product designs can conceivably qualify
as inherently distinctive according to Abercrombie and still not
identify their.producers, because this test presumes that inno-
vative trade symbols serve as source signifiers. However, un-
like trademarks and packaging, even original product configu-
rations may not identify producers in industries where the
development of creative designs is customary and necessary to
compete effectively.
Thus, the Abercrombie classifications must be supplement-
ed with a test which verifies a product configuration's capacity
to inform consumers of product origin. The proper preliminary
test should consider the functionality of the design and the
extent to which creative design determines commercial success
in the industry. The combination of the four-prong Abercrombie
test and this preliminary hurdle will ensure that inherently
distinctive product configurations are not only creative, but
also designate their source.
Hermenegildo A Isidro*
* The author thanks Richard Z. Lehv and Leo J. Raskind for their construc-
tive criticism of prior drafts.

